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ESSAY
RECLAIMING THE LEGAL FICTION OF
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION
Lisa Schultz Bressman*
INTRODUCTION

T

HE framework for judicial review of agency statutory interpretation rests on a legal fiction: Congress intends to delegate in-

terpretive authority to federal agencies whenever it fails to resolve

clearly the meaning of statutory language.' When the Supreme
Court presented this fiction as a justification for judicial deference
in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,' crit-

ics argued that it was both false and fraudulent. First, they argued
that the fiction misperceives how Congress behaves. Congress is
unlikely to intend a delegation of interpretive authority to an
agency when it leaves statutory ambiguity.' If anything, Congress
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. I am grateful to Bill Eskridge, Abbe Gluck, Gillian Metzger, Suzanna Sherry, Kevin Stack, Peter Strauss, and the participants of the Columbia Law
School Legislation Colloquium for comments on this Essay, and to the faculty workshop participants at Harvard Law School for comments that prompted this inquiry. I
would like to thank Eva Dossier and Karen Usselman for excellent research assistance.
'Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 865
(1984); see also Lon L. Fuller, Legal Fiction 1 (1967) (describing legal fictions as
"conceits of the legal imagination"); Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein's
New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1203, 1212 (1990) (noting that statutory interpretation, like other areas of the law, is
pervaded by legal fictions); Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 Geo. L.J. 1435,
1449-64 (2007) (identifying new legal fictions across areas of the law, including statutory interpretation).
2 467 U.S. at 837.
3
See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 Tex.
L. Rev. 113, 197-98 (1998) (pointing to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")
as evidence that Congress likely intended for courts to exercise independent judgment
on interpretive questions); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Bal-
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is likely to intend for courts to exercise independent judicial judgment under such circumstances.' Second, critics contended that the
fiction misrepresents what the Court is doing. The Court does not
care about whether Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority in any particular instance.5 Rather, the Court applies an
across-the-board presumption of congressional delegation triggered by statutory ambiguity.6 The fact that the Court moved away
from an across-the-board presumption in United States v. Mead
Corp., requiring a more particularized inquiry into legislative intent,7 has not dampened these criticisms. Scholars continue to argue that the Court's fiction is both false and fraudulent.8 As a result, these scholars have felt free to disregard the role of

ance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 471 (1989) (arguing
that Congress's use of "equally expansive language in statutory schemes committed to
judicial oversight ... seem[s] to undermine any notion" that agencies are preferred
over courts to "interpret[] broad statutory mandates"); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 995 (1992) (pointing to background understandings and the provisions of the APA that may undermine the presumption that Congress intends ambiguous language to be interpreted by agencies
rather than the courts); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 421, 468 (1987) (noting that Chevron does not accurately reflect congressional intent since "[t]he APA-the basic charter governing judicial review and
Chevron itself-was born in a period of considerable distrust of agency activity" and
recent indications of congressional intent also suggest "that Congress favors a relatively aggressive judicial role").
'See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
'See Evan J. Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1271, 1285 (2008)
("[T]he assumption 'that silence or ambiguity confers that kind of interpretative authority on the agency is unacceptable, for it assumes the very point in issue and thus
fails to distinguish between statutory ambiguities on the one hand and legislative
delegations of law-interpreting power to agencies on the other ... ' (quoting CSX
Transp. v. United States, 867 F.2d 1439, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J., dissentin )) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
Duke L.J. 511, 516 (noting that Chevron established "an across-the-board presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discretion is meant").
'533 U.S. 218, 232-33 (2001).
8 See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine,
2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 203 (2001) (labeling the fiction "fraudulent"); Criddle, supra
note 5, at 1302 (labeling the fiction a "trope"); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of
Skidmore, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 735, 753 (2002) (labeling the fiction a "bad farce");
Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron's Foundation, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 273, 311 (2011) (labeling the fiction "unsupportable").
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congressional delegation in the debate over the best allocation of
interpretive authority between courts and agencies.'
In this Essay, I argue that these critics have been proceeding on

a fiction about a fiction. They have misread (1) how Congress behaves and (2) what the Court is doing. First, with regard to legislative behavior, I show that there is empirical and theoretical research supporting the notion that Congress does attend to the
delegation of interpretive authority when it chooses particular language." This work calls into question, and provides reason to
doubt, the claim that Congress does not think about the delegation
of interpretive authority at all or in the way that the Court imagines. It also provides reason to believe that the basic presumption
of congressional delegation is well grounded. Furthermore, it pro-

vides reason to assume that an express delegation of regulatory authority generally carries an implied delegation of interpretive authority. Critics of the Court's framework have not sufficiently
credited this work or the view that it suggests.

After providing a sense of how Congress is delegating interpretive authority both in general and in particular statutes, I then address judicial practice to demonstrate that the Court is neither as
inventive nor incorrect as critics contend. Political scientists have
shown what Congress cares about when it delegates regulatory au-

9See, e.g., Barron & Kagan, supra note 8, at 204 (arguing that the Court should consider who issued the interpretation within the agency when allocating interpretive authority); Criddle, supra note 5, at 1273 (arguing that the Court should consider diverse, pluralistic views).
"0See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality
Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 Stan.
L. Rev. 627, 641 (2002) ("[I]t is not unusual for competing factions of Congress to
'agree to disagree' in the drafting of a statute" and seek resolution by another institution.); Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress's Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 363, 369-70 (2010)
[hereinafter Lemos, Consequences] (noting that "Congress often opts for legislation
that addresses [a] problem generally but leaves the most contentious details unresolved," thereby "delegating the ultimate decision to an agency"); Margaret H.
Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 405, 434 (2008) [hereinafter Lemos, The Other Delegate]
(stating that Congress intends to delegate interpretive authority to agencies); Victoria
F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional
Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575, 596 (2002) (interviewing legislative staffers who
confirm that legislators use deliberate ambiguity to obtain consensus, intending to influence subsequent agency interpretations).
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thority, and their sense is consistent with the Court's sense." When
the Court applies a presumption of congressional delegation of interpretive authority, it makes a connection between interpretive
authority and regulatory authority that closely tracks Congress's
design choices. So, too, when the Court conducts a particularized
inquiry into congressional delegation of interpretive authority, it
relies on factors that closely track Congress's design choices. The
Court has been doing a decent job of imagining how Congress, as a
political institution, would think about the delegation of interpretive authority. Meanwhile, critics perhaps have been too fixated on
legal values to properly appreciate the Court's pragmatic view of
Congress.
In the end, I demonstrate that the fiction of congressional delegation is an ordinary one. It is a fiction only in the sense that the
Court is not searching for actual legislative intent but is imputing
legislative intent. After Chevron and before Mead, the Court imputed legislative intent from statutory ambiguity. With Mead and
continuing forward, the Court examines other indications in the
statutory context and the legislative history, asking whether Congress reasonably intended to delegate interpretive authority. 2 The
Court often makes similar moves in other contexts when determining the meaning of statutory language. Specifically, it considers
what Congress might reasonably have intended as to the meaning
of the language, looking at the statutory text, statutory context, and
legislative history." This sort of fiction is reflective of a general
shift away from a search for actual legislative intent that occurred

" See, e.g., David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and
the Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 947, 950
(1999) ("[L]egislators will delegate those issue areas where the normal legislative
process is least efficient relative to regulatory policymaking by executive agencies.");
Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. Econ. & Org. 243, 246 (1987) [hereinafter McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures] (asserting that Congress designs
administrative procedures to facilitate legislative monitoring and influence of agency
action under broad statutes); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R.
Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements
and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431, 442 (1989) [hereinafter
McCubbins et al., Structure and Process] (same).
12See, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212,222 (2002); Mead, 533 U.S. at 230.
13 See infra note 192 (citing illustrative cases).
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after the Legal Realist movement. 4 For some, it has specific roots
in the Legal Process School." Justice Breyer is the leading advocate
for this sort of fiction, but he is not the only one who embraces it. 6
The fiction of congressional delegation is not without weaknesses, though they are not the ones that critics by and large have
been pressing. For example, to the extent that the fiction leads the
Court to use a standard-based approach and rely on non-textual
sources, it is subject to the standard critiques of those practices.' 7
Thus, Justice Scalia chastised the Court in Mead for swapping
Chevron's clean rule for "th'ol' 'totality of the circumstances'
test,"' 8 but critics of the fiction generally have not reprised the
rules/standards debate or the legislative history debate. They have
instead argued that the fiction is not worth taking seriously. If the
fiction is not as they believe, their arguments would benefit from
further reflection.
In other writing, I have argued that the fiction serves an important normative value, tethering the Court's framework to separation of powers by ensuring that Congress retains a role in lawmaking. 9 I have addressed ways of clarifying the contours of the fiction

" See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 870, 872 (1930)
(casting doubt on whether Congress, a multi-member body, has a single, collective
intention and whether a court possesses the tools to recover that intention).
5 See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process 1378 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (proposing that courts interpret statutes
by attributing a reasonable intention to Congress).
" See Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty 88 (2005) ("At the heart of a purpose-based
approach stands 'the reasonable member of Congress'-a legal fiction that applies,
for example, even when Congress did not in fact consider a particular problem."); id.
at 88-98 (describing Supreme Court decisions implicating this approach); Stephen
Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge's View 98-102 (2010) (making similar arguments); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 198 (2006)
(noting that Justice Breyer, while still on the Court of Appeals, assessed congressional
delegation in a particularized manner based on "what a sensible legislator would have
expected given the statutory circumstances" (quoting Mayburg v. Sec'y of Health &
Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
" See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 2937 (1997) (discussing and rejecting judicial reliance on legislative history).
18 Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 245 (further contending that the test would cause "protracted confusion" among lower courts because of
the "utter flabbiness of the Court's criterion").
'9 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107
Colum. L. Rev. 1749, 1790-91 (2007).
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to minimize the confusion that it has wrought among lower courts.'
I have also described ways of extending the fiction to address a
problem implicit in the Court's framework, specifically that courts
can use the traditional tools of statutory construction to find a clear
statutory meaning despite signs that Congress intended to delegate
interpretive authority to the agency.21
My intention is not to reargue these points here. The concern of
this Essay is more fundamental: by believing that the fiction is
worse than it is, critics have had license to disregard the role of
congressional delegation in evaluating how to allocate interpretive
authority between courts and agencies. My argument brings the
question of how to allocate interpretive authority between courts
and agencies back to how Congress designs statutes. Critics can still
argue that other considerations should prevail in the final analysis,
but they must confront legislative interests head on.
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the Supreme
Court decisions that established the fiction. In these decisions, the
Court transitioned from an across-the-board presumption of congressional delegation to a particularized analysis under certain circumstances. Part II describes the criticisms of the fiction. After
Chevron, the critics launched a two-part attack: (1) Congress does
not think about the delegation of interpretive authority in the way
that the Court does, and (2) the Court does not actually care about
whether Congress intends to delegate interpretive authority to the
agency in any particular instance. Even though the Court changed
the framework in Mead to get a closer read of legislative intent, the
criticisms remained largely the same. Part III demonstrates the
weaknesses of these persistent criticisms. First, there is direct evidence in the work of legal scholars that supports the Court's picture of legislative behavior. Second, there is indirect evidence in
the work of political scientists that supports the Court's tools of
statutory construction. This evidence shows that the fiction is neither false nor fraudulent, contrary to scholarly belief. Part IV addresses the "true" character of the fiction, arguing that the fiction
is no different in kind from the one that the Court applies more
'0See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443, 1448 (2005).
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 Duke L.J. 549, 575-76 (2009).
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generally in statutory interpretation. Thus, critics have no special
reason to reject the fiction and have felt too free to depart from it
in evaluating the proper allocation of interpretive authority between courts and agencies.
I. THE LEGAL FICTION
In this Part, I set forth the decisions that established the legal fiction of congressional delegation. In Chevron, the Court held that
Congress intends to implicitly delegate interpretive authority to an
agency whenever it fails to resolve the meaning of statutory tanguage.22 The Court did not actually inquire into whether Congress
intended to delegate interpretive authority in a particular instance
but created an across-the-board presumption based on statutory
ambiguity. 3 It departed from that presumption in United States v.
Mead Corp.4 and Barnhartv. Walton," conducting a particularized
inquiry into whether Congress intended to delegate interpretive
authority with "the force of law." It conducted a particularized inquiry in other important decisions as well.26 Thus, the Court started
with an across-the-board presumption of legislative intent and
transitioned to a particularized inquiry under certain circumstances.
A. The Presumption
In Chevron, the Court established a two-step test for courts to
apply when reviewing agency interpretations of the statutes that
those agencies administer. 7 The first step asks courts to determine
whether "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue." ' If the statute is clear, then that meaning controls.29 But if
U.S. at 842-44.
" Id.
24 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 237-38 (2001) (recognizing that judicial deference is not ap22467

propriate unless Congress intends an agency to issue an interpretation with "the force

of law").
535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267-68 (2006); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159-60 (2000).
25467 U.S. at 842-43.
2 Id. at 842-43 & n.9.
29
1Id.at 842.
26
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the statute is ambiguous, the second step instructs courts to defer
to the agency's interpretation as long as that interpretation is "reasonable."' The Court justified judicial deference primarily on a
theory of congressional delegation: Congress intends to delegate
interpretive authority to the agency whenever it fails to resolve the
meaning of particular statutory language.31 The Court offered numerous reasons why Congress might intend for agencies rather
than courts to fill gaps in regulatory statutes, such as capitalizing on
agency expertise, lack of legislative foresight, or to obtain consensus on an issue while allowing divergent coalitions to "take their
chances" on a favorable resolution at the administrative level.32 But
the Court did not ask whether Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority based on any of these reasons in a particular
instance. Instead, it created a presumption of congressional delega'0Id. at 843-44.
31Id. The Court wrote:
The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created ...program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making
of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. If Congress has
explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of
an agency.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court also premised judicial
deference on a theory of agency expertise and political accountability. Id. at 865 (noting that agencies possess more expertise than courts for handling regulatory schemes
that are "technical and complex" and for reconciling the "competing political interests" that regulatory decisions often involve, that agencies are more accountable to
the people than courts "not directly but through the Chief Executive," and that "it is
entirely appropriate for this political branch of Government to make such policy
choices").
32Id. at 865. The Court stated:
Congress intended to accommodate both [statutory] interests, but did not do so
itself on the level of specificity presented by these cases. Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking
that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering
the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not
consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a
coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take
their chances with the scheme devised by the agency.
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tion that purportedly applied across the board, triggered by a finding of statutory ambiguity.
The presumption never actually applied entirely across the
board. In Martin v. OccupationalSafety and Health Review Commission, the Court departed from the presumption because it had
no other choice.33 The case involved the Occupational Health and
Safety Act of 1970 ("OSH Act"), a so-called split-enforcement
statute. 3' Most regulatory statutes combine rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative powers in a single agency.35 The OSH Act
grants both the Secretary of Labor and the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission certain powers.36 It directs the
Secretary to set workplace health and safety standards through the
notice-and-comment rulemaking process.37 In addition, the Secretary is authorized to enforce those standards by issuing a citation
and assessing a monetary penalty if she determines after investigation that an employer has violated a standard.3" The OSH Act
grants the Commission, a three person body appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, adjudicatory functions that
are triggered if an employer wishes to contest a citation.39
The Court could not apply a presumption based on statutory
ambiguity to determine the allocation of interpretive authority between the two agencies. It therefore conducted a particularized inquiry of congressional delegation. The Court examined the inferences that could be drawn about legislative intent from the
statutory context and the legislative history. ' It focused on the
"historical familiarity and policymaking expertise" of the Secretary, finding her in a better position to interpret her own rules and
the statute. 41 Because these factors would lead Congress to prefer
an agency to a court, they would also lead Congress to prefer one
" 499 U.S. 144 (1991).
Id. at 147, 151.
. Id. at 151.
3Id. at 147.
37
Id.
3'Id.
39Id. at 147-48.
4 Id. at 152 ("infer[ring] from the structure and history of the statute... that the
power to render authoritative interpretations of OSH Act regulations is a 'necessary
adjunct' of the Secretary's powers to promulgate and to enforce national health and
safety standards" (internal citation omitted)).
41 Id. at 152-53.
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agency (that is, the Secretary) over the other (that is, the Commission).42 In the legislative history, the Court found confirmation for
its view of the Secretary's expertise, as well as evidence that Congress intended to hold a single actor responsible for formulating
the OSH standards and ensuring that they are effectively implemented. 3 The Court also drew a connection between express rulemaking authority and implied interpretive authority. Because the
Commission lacked rulemaking authority, the Court declined to
find that Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority to
the Commission. Rather, Congress intended to delegate only
"nonpolicymaking adjudicatory powers" to the Commission.
Thus, the Court recognized almost from the beginning that an
across-the-board presumption could not always work, and it began
to sketch the contours of a more particularized inquiry.
B. The ParticularizedInquiry
Despite the Court's initial announcement in Chevron of an
across-the-board presumption, it has conducted a more particularized inquiry in two circumstances: (1) when there is evidence that
the issue is too significant to delegate and (2) when the agency uses
a less-than-formal interpretive method. The Court could have
technically applied the presumption in both of these circumstances.
Because it did not, both are moderations of Chevron.
1. Too-Big-to-Delegate Questions
In Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, the Court departed from the presumption of congressional
delegation because it was unwilling to infer a delegation of authority over certain questions based on mere statutory ambiguity.46 The
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") issued a regulation interat 152.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 158-59.
4' Id. at 154.
42Id.

3

4'529 U.S. 120, 159-60 (2000). The Court has applied the too-big-to-delegate doctrine in other cases. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S.
218, 231 (1994) (holding that the authority to eliminate a central feature of the Communications Act was too significant for Congress to have intended to delegate to the
Federal Communication Commission through statutory ambiguity).
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preting the words of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA")
to include tobacco products, including cigarettes, and imposing
regulations on such products.47 The Court held that Congress had
not granted the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products. As a
technical matter, it held that the statute was clear on this point,4
but the language was not clear. Instead, the Court inferred legislative intent from a series of later-enacted statutes. These statutes
were tobacco-specific and none of them granted jurisdiction to the
FDA or indeed granted any agency the authority to regulate tobacco pervasively." The Court also found a poor fit between tobacco and FDA jurisdiction. Another statute guaranteed the continued marketing of tobacco, yet the FDA was obligated to ban
any unsafe product, and it had determined that tobacco was unsafe." On the basis of this particularized analysis, the Court concluded that Congress had not intended to delegate authority over
tobacco to the FDA. 2 It said that the statute was clear, but the only
clarity that the Court found was on the delegation question.
If there was any doubt on this point, the Court confirmed its
concern for delegation by stating that some questions were simply
too significant to support an inference of delegation based on
statutory ambiguity." The FDA had "asserted jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a significant portion of the American
economy" and a product with "its own unique place in political history." 4 The magnitude of the assertion made it unlikely that Con-

"Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 127 (reporting the FDA's determination that
nicotine is a "drug" within the meaning of the FDCA because it "affect[s] the structure or [a] function of the body" (quoting Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg.
44,396, 44,631, 45,208 (Aug. 28, 1996))) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. (reporting that cigarettes are "combination products" for the delivery of those effects
(quoting Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Tobacco
to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,396)).
48 Id. at 156, 161.
49
Id.at 156, 160-61.
' Id. at 137-38, 156 (collecting statutes).
Id. at 137 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994)).
52Id. at 156, 161.
13Id. at 159.
Id.
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gress had silently intended to delegate interpretive authority to the
FDA.55
The Court applied the too-big-to-delegate doctrine again in Oregon v. Gonzalez,56 performing an even more particularized analysis
than it had in Brown & Williamson. The Attorney General issued
an Interpretive Bulletin interpreting the federal criminal drug laws
to restrict physician-assisted suicide in the wake of a state law permitting the practice." The Court held that Congress would not
have intended to delegate interpretive authority to the Attorney
General over this issue. 8 Although the Court could have simply attacked the form in which the interpretation appeared as in Mead, it
instead found that the issue was too significant for Congress to
have delegated through mere statutory ambiguity. 9 As in Martin,
Congress had not delegated rulemaking authority to the Attorney
General, and the Attorney General lacked "historical familiarity
and policymaking expertise."' The Attorney General had no experience with the regulation of physician-assisted suicide or the restriction of controlled substances.61 Rather, the Attorney General
was responsible for the non-policymaking aspects of the federal
drug laws, including the registration and marketing of controlled
substances.62 As in Brown & Williamson, the Court examined the
history of physician-assisted suicide, noting that "Americans are
engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide."63 The magnitude of the debate made it all the more likely that Congress did not

5'Id. at 160.
6 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
7
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.800-995 (2003); Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 253-54 (noting that the Attorney General determined that physicianassisted suicide was not a "legitimate medical purpose" for which physicians might
dispense and prescribe controlled substances under the Controlled Substances Act
and its regulations (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267.
9
Id. at 268.
Id. at 266 (quoting Martin, 499 U.S. at 153).
61

2

6
6

Id. at 269.

Id. at 259 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 821 (Supp. V 2000)).
Id. at 249 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
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intend to subtly delegate interpretive authority to the Attorney
General. 4
2. Less- Than-FormalProcedures
In Mead, the Court departed from the presumption of congressional delegation in the most significant way to date. 65 It was not
faced with an issue that was too big to delegate, as in Brown & Williamson. Rather, it was faced with an interpretive method that was
too informal to carry the force of law. The United States Customs
Service sent a Ruling Letter to the Mead Corporation in which the
agency interpreted its statute to impose a tax on a particular product that the Mead Corporation imported for sale.' The Court held
that this interpretation was not entitled to the application of Chevron because Congress had not delegated authority to the agency to
issue interpretations carrying the "force of law" through Ruling
Letters.67 The Court reached this conclusion after examining the
character of the Ruling Letters and the conduct of the agency."
Ruling Letters do not reflect "fairness and deliberation" or "bespeak the legislative type of activity that.

. .

naturally bind[s] more

than the parties to the ruling."69 Nor had the agency acted "with a
lawmaking pretense in mind.""° It issued Ruling Letters at too great
a rate (10,000 per year) from too many different offices (forty-six
in all) for it to claim that such Letters carry the force of law.' On
the basis of these individualized considerations, the Court held that
the agency was not entitled to Chevron deference. 2 At best, the
agency could earn a lesser form of judicial deference under
Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 3
In Barnhart, the Court conducted a particularized inquiry into
another informal interpretive method using different factors than it

Id. at 267-68.
See Mead, 533 U.S 218.
6Id. at 225.
7
Id.at 221, 226-27.
6'Id. at 233.
6
9Id. at 230, 232.
6

70
Id.at
71Id.

233.

at 234.
Id.at 234-35; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).

7 Id.
73
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had used in Mead.74 Over a period of forty years, the Social Security Administration had included a certain interpretation in an Insurance Letter, a Disability Insurance State Manual, and a Social
Security Ruling before issuing it in a notice-and-comment rule.
The Court first determined that the interpretation satisfied both
conventional steps of Chevron.6 It then found that the interpretation was entitled to judicial deference under Chevron even though
it lacked procedural formality until shortly before litigation. Performing a particularized analysis, the Court observed that the interpretation was of "longstanding duration," which counts toward
judicial deference, as does the "interpretive method used and the
nature of the question at issue. 7 8 In this case, the Court found that
these factors and others supported an inference of congressional
delegation:
[T]he interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the
careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a
long period of time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through which to view the legality of the Agency
interpretation here at issue.79
The Court has reinforced its particularized inquiry in other decisions." Furthermore, it has held that the inquiry is valid even if a

74

Barnhart,535 U.S. at 217.
7 Id. at 219-20.
76Id. at 218-19.
77Id. at 221.
78
1Id.at 220, 222 (internal quotation marks omitted).
79

Id.at 222.
'oSee, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S.Ct.
704, 713-14 (2011) (finding that Congress delegated authority to issue interpretations
of the Internal Revenue Code with the force of law to the Treasury Department and
that such authority makes those interpretations eligible for Chevron deference); Long
Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173-74 (2007) (finding that Congress
had delegated authority to issue interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act with
the force of law to the Department of Labor). In Mayo Foundation and Long Island
Care, the Court stated that Chevron applies "[w]here an agency rule sets forth important individual rights and duties, where the agency focuses fully and directly upon the
issue, where the agency uses full notice-and-comment procedures to promulgate a
rule, [and] where the resulting rule falls within the statutory grant of authority." Mayo

2011]

Fiction of CongressionalDelegation

2023

court has already issued an interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision. In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Services, the Court stated that an agency can effectively overrule a prior judicial interpretation of an ambiguous
statutory provision as long as it possesses a delegation of interpretive authority and uses that authority to issue its own interpretation. The fact that the court got there first does not deprive the
agency of its delegated interpretive authority.
3. Routine Questions?
Some evidence suggests that the preference for a particularized
inquiry may spread beyond the two limited circumstances of significant questions and non-formalized procedures. In Zuni Public
School District No. 89 v. Department of Education, Justice Breyer
extended the particularized inquiry of congressional delegation to
a routine question-the sort that did not involve significant questions or informal procedures.' The Secretary of Education had issued an interpretation of a calculation provision of a federal education statute. 8' Basically, the statute allowed states to offset the costs
of education with federal funds only if they "equalize[d] expenditures" among their public school districts.' To determine that a
state had equalized expenditures, the Secretary must determine
that the disparity in per-pupil expenditures among school districts
does not exceed twenty-five percent, "disregard[ing]" school districts "with per-pupil expenditures" in the top and bottom fifth
percent.85 The Secretary had issued regulations, which it applied
consistently for thirty years, calculating the upper and lower percentile cutoffs based not only on the number of districts (ranked by
their per-pupil expenditures) but on the number of pupils in those
districts.86 If the Secretary had just considered the number of dis-

Foundation, 131 S. Ct. at 714 (quoting Long Island Care, 551 U.S. at 173) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
81545 U.S. 967, 982-85 (2005).
82550 U.S. 81, 93-100 (2007).
3
See 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist., 545 U.S. at 86-87.
85 See

20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(2)(A) (2006).
See id. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006).
Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. at 86-87.

2024

VirginiaLaw Review

[Vol. 97:2009

tricts, New Mexico would not have qualified for a federal offset.'
Under the Secretary's size-adjusted calculation, the state qualified
for a federal offset and could use that offset to decide how to
equalize school funding across the districts.'
Justice Breyer wrote that the Secretary was entitled to Chevron
deference, but he expressly departed from the normal order of the
two-step test to get there. Rather than starting with the clarity of
the statutory language, he started with the particularized evidence
of congressional delegation.89 He noted that the issue was a highly
technical one, the Secretary was involved in legislative drafting,
and the Secretary had maintained a consistent position throughout.' According to Justice Breyer, all of these factors indicated that
Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority to the Secretary.91 The interpretation was also reasonable in light of the purpose of the statute, and because it was reasonable in light of the
purpose, the language did not absolutely preclude it.'
Only Justice Ginsburg agreed with Justice Breyer's analysis. Justice Stevens concurred because he found the legislative history was
"pellucidly clear" and favored the Secretary's interpretation. 9 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito, concurred because he found
the statute ambiguous and the agency's interpretation reasonable. '
But he expressed concern that inverting the steps of Chevron
would elevate "agency policy concerns" over "the traditional tools
of statutory construction."95 Justice Scalia, joined by the remaining
three Justices, dissented, relying on the literal language of the statute, which said "per-pupil expenditures," plain and simple.' Thus,
no other Justice except perhaps Justice Ginsburg would take the
particularized inquiry as far as Justice Breyer would. Nevertheless,
Justice Breyer's approach still stands as a sort of testament to how
far the doctrine has come in roughly two decades-from an acrossId. at 88-89.
88Id.
Id. at 90.
9'Id.
91Id.

' Id. at
93Id. at
Id. at
9
' Id.
Id. at

90-91.
106 (Stevens, J., concurring).
107 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
113-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the-board presumption to a particularized inquiry of congressional
delegation under certain circumstances.
II. THE SCHOLARLY CRITICISMS

In this Part, I set forth the scholarly criticisms of the Court's reliance on the notion of implicit congressional delegation. I demonstrate that, despite the transition from an across-the-board presumption to a particularized inquiry under certain circumstances,
the scholarly criticisms have remained largely the same. They have
simply shifted to a different playing field.
Critics essentially tell a two-part tale. First, Congress does not intend to delegate interpretive authority to an agency whenever it
fails to resolve a statutory question. If anything, Congress intends
for courts to exercise independent judicial judgment. Second, the
Court does not actually care about whether Congress intended to
delegate interpretive authority in any particular instance. It either
applies a presumption triggered by statutory ambiguity or considers factors that have no bearing on congressional delegation. Chevron's fiction of congressional delegation is therefore both false and
fraudulent. As a result, critics have disregarded it-just as, in their
view, the Court has been free to do so-and followed their preferred position on how best to allocate interpretive authority between courts and agencies.97
A. Legislative Behavior
Shortly after Chevron was decided, critics argued that congressional delegation was a legal fiction because Congress is unlikely to
intend a delegation of interpretive authority to agencies when it
leaves a statutory ambiguity. If anything, Congress is likely to intend for courts to exercise independent judicial judgment. As we
shall see, critics offered a variety of reasons, so the argument took
a variety of forms.
Critics first argued that congressional delegation is really an inference of legislative intent based on legislative silence, which is to
say the failure of Congress to provide a different judicial deference

97See, e.g., Criddle, supra note 5, at 1302 (advocating an interpretive framework
based on diverse, pluralistic values).
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rule.98 But, they noted, legislative silence is always a questionable
basis for an inference of legislative intent. As Professor Thomas
Merrill stated, "in order to establish that Congress has mandated
the practice of deference, the Court should be able to point to
more than a debatable inference from congressional inaction."'
Critics also offered a form of expressio unius est exclusion alterius argument-the mention of one thing precludes the inference
of another."° Because Congress knows how to write explicit delegations of regulatory authority, it is unlikely to make implicit delegations of interpretive authority."' Put simply, Congress knows how
to delegate when it wants to delegate.
Relatedly, critics rejected a kind of greater-includes-the-lesser
argument. There was no general understanding before Chevron
that Congress intended to implicitly delegate interpretive authority
whenever it gave an agency the power to issue rules or regulations."2 Some scholars suggested that a delegation of rulemaking
authority only conveyed the power to issue procedural rules or interpretive rules rather than Chevron-style legislative rules." 3 Therefore, the greater delegation of general regulatory authority did not

98Merrill,

supra note 3, at 995 ("The strongest evidence in support of the Court's

presumption is the fact that Congress knows about the practice of judicial deference
to99agency interpretations and has not acted to prohibit it.").
Id. Professors Thomas Merrill and Kristen Hickman, although writing after United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S 218 (2001), make the point that "pre-Chevron case law
generally provided that agency interpretations embodied in an exercise of a general
rulemaking power were entitled to less deference than interpretations rendered pursuant to a specific grant of rulemaking power." Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E.
Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 871 n.212 (2001) (citing United States
v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982); Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S.
247, 253 (1981); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309 (1979)).
'00See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (describing the expressio unius est exclusio alteriuscanon of construction).
101 Duffy, supra note 3, at 199 ("Congress has no trouble writing express delegations
to agencies when it wants."); Merrill, supra note 3, at 995 ("The very practice of enacting specific delegations of interpretative authority suggests that Congress understands that no such general authority exists.").
" Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 45 & n.208 (1990) (observing that the understanding before Chevron may have been that the delegation of rulemaking power in organic statutes did not confer the authority to issue legislative rules and asserting that Chevron
should
be understood to reflect a departure from that understanding).
10
3Id.
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include the lesser (but still significant) delegation of interpretive
authority.
Critics also made the argument that imputing legislative intent to
delegate is inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). ' 4 The APA, the umbrella statute that provides default procedural and judicial review provisions, suggests that Congress intended courts to exercise independent judicial judgment on questions of law. Consider Merrill: "[T]he one general statute on point,
the Administrative Procedure Act, directs reviewing courts to 'decide all relevant questions of law.' If anything, this suggests that
Congress contemplated [that] courts would always apply indefor
pendent judgment on questions of law, reserving deference
105
administrative findings of fact or determinations of policy."
Professor John Duffy considered the relationship between congressional delegation and the APA at length. He disagreed with
Merrill and others about the significance of the "questions of law"
provision because, under Chevron, a "court does interpret the statute de novo; the court just finds that the statute gives the agency
the power to make the rule of decision."" ° But Duffy objected to
the Chevron approach on other grounds: "[t]he problem with the
'implicit delegation' view of Chevron is that it violates another
provision of the APA," ° section 558(b), which forbids agencies
from issuing "substantive rule[s] . . . except [(1)] within jurisdiction
delegated to the agency and [(2)] as authorized by law."" Duffy
argued that implicit congressional delegation violates this "[o]ften
overlooked" provision because it allows an agency to assert a "de
facto rule-making power so long as only the first condition is satis-

"Farina, supra note 3, at 471 (arguing that Congress's use of "equally expansive
language in statutory schemes committed to judicial oversight... seem[s] to undermine any notion" that agencies are preferred over courts to "interpret[] broad statutory mandates"); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 468 (noting that Chevron does not accurately reflect congressional intent since "[t]he APA-the basic charter governing
judicial review and Chevron itself-was born in a period of considerable distrust of
agency activity" and recent indications of congressional intent also suggest "that Congress favors a relatively aggressive judicial role").
,' Merrill, supra note 3, at 995 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988)).
:06 Duffy, supra note 3, at 198.
7
O'
Id.
'0'5 U.S.C. § 558(b) (1994).
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fied-the agency has ...jurisdiction over the statute."" For the
phrase "authorized by law" to have force and effect as a limit on
substantive rules, Congress must have envisioned that courts rather
than agencies would interpret the relevant law.
Scholars also provide justifications for the APA's preference for
independent judicial judgment. As Professor Cass Sunstein argued,
"Congress's fear of agency bias or even abdication makes it most
doubtful that the legislature has sought deference to the agency
under all circumstances."" 0 Congress, aware of agency pathologies,
sought a judicial check to counteract them.
After the Court decided Mead, one might have expected at least
some of these criticisms to recede. The Court attempted to take a
closer look at congressional delegation, determining what Congress
intended in a particular instance. It was no longer relying on a
blanket presumption of how Congress acts. Yet the criticisms continued and even intensified.
Professor David Barron and then-Professor Elena Kagan reflected that mood."' Writing in response to Mead, they asserted
that Congress probably does not think about the delegation of interpretive authority at all, let alone in the way that the Court imag' Like Merrill and others, they focused on legislative silence,
ines. 12
observing that Congress usually says nothing about the delegation
of interpretive authority."' The question is what inference to draw
from legislative silence on this issue:
To be sure, Congress's usual silence on this matter may express
agreement with a broad rule of deference to agency interpretations. But this explanation seems improbable given (1) Congress's similar passivity on this issue prior to Chevron, and (2)
Congress's certain appreciation of variety in both administrative
statutes and administrative decision-making processes. It is far
more likely that Congress, unless confronting a serious problem
"9Duffy, supra note 3, at 198 (quoting Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 564 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"0Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev.
2071, 2090-91 (1990).
"..Barron & Kagan, supra note 8, at 216 (arguing that the Mead Court actually "obscured the nature of the judicial task involved in defining Chevron's domain").
112
Id.
113Id.
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in the exercise of some interpretive authority, simply fails to
think about this allocation of power between judges and agencies.' 14

They had strong words for the Court's approach: "Congress so
rarely discloses (or, perhaps, even has) a view on this subject as to
make a search for legislative intent chimerical and a conclusion re-

'
garding that intent fraudulent in the mine run of cases."" Other
scholars reprised the more moderate claim about legislative silence. Merrill, joined by Professor Kristin Hickman, maintained
that legislative silence provides a weak foundation for congressional delegation. "6 Thus, legislative silence should not be dispositive.
Critics also reintroduced the other pre-Mead arguments. They
argued in favor of an expressio unius understanding-that Congress knows how to write express delegations when it wants-and
against a greater-includes-lesser understanding that a delegation of
regulatory authority confers a delegation of interpretive authority."1 7 Consider Merrill and Hickman: "At the time Chevron was
decided, there was no established background understanding that a
decision by Congress to confer general rulemaking or adjudicatory
authority on an agency would be deemed a decision to transfer primary interpretational authority to the agency. If anything, the un-

derstanding was to the contrary.

'

Id.
,'Id. at 203.
1,6 Merrill & Hickman, supra note 99, at 871 ("In addition, Congress has never acted
14

to signal general disapproval of courts exercising independent review in matters of
statutory interpretation."); see also Seidenfeld, supra note 8, at 278 (arguing that legislative silence is a weak indication of congressional delegation).
..
7Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 779, 797-98
(2010) ("[E]xcept in those situations in which Congress explicitly delegates interpretive authority to an agency ... there is little reason to believe that ambiguity signals
congressional intent to delegate interpretive authority to the administering agency
and not to the reviewing court."); Criddle, supra note 5, at 1285 (referencing the argument).
"' Merrill & Hickman, supra note 99, at 871 & n.212 (citing decisions in which the
Court refused to imply a delegation of interpretive authority to the Internal Revenue
Service based on an explicit delegation of regulatory authority to the agency in the
Internal Revenue Code); see also Beermann, supra note 117, at 810-11 (describing
the pre-Chevron understanding reflected in the tax cases).
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Critics once again asserted the argument that congressional
delegation is inconsistent with the APA."1 9 The APA suggests that
Congress intended to impose an independent judicial check on
agency interpretation. To explain why, Professor Jack Beermann
picked up where Sunstein left off in addressing Congress's perception of agencies, arguing that "Congress does not usually view
agencies as trusted partners, but rather views them as competing
entities that need to be kept in line." 2° Especially because agencies
are often dominated by the President, Beermann continued, it is
unlikely that Congress would simply allow them to run the shop
unattended. 21
In sum, Mead may have changed the Court's interpretive framework to better calibrate legislative intent, but it did not alter the
criticisms of congressional delegation. Scholars have continued to
argue often more vociferously than before that the notion of implicit congressional delegation is a legal fiction because it reflects a
false picture of legislative behavior. But these criticisms comprise
only half of the story, as the next Section shows.
B. JudicialPractice
When Chevron was decided, critics contended that the Court
applied a legal fiction because it did not actually inquire into
whether Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority in
any particular instance.122 Rather, it applied an across-the-board
119
Beermann,

supra note 117, at 788 ("The most startling thing about Chevron ini-

tially is that it appears inconsistent with the APA's judicial review provisions.");
Criddle, supra note 5, at 1285-86 ("Critics of the congressional delegation theory have
argued persuasively that Congress expressly disclaimed any such intent to delegate
interpretive authority in the Administrative Procedure Act... by directing reviewing
courts to 'decide all relevant questions of law."' (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000))); Seidenfeld, supra note 8, at 278-79 (arguing that congressional delegation is inconsistent
with the APA's judicial review provision).
20Beermann, supra note 117, at 799.
121

Id.

'2

CSX Transp. v. United States, 867 F.2d 1439, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J.,

dissenting) ("[T]hat silence or ambiguity confers that kind of interpretative authority
on the agency is unacceptable, for it assumes the very point in issue and thus fails to
distinguish between statutory ambiguities on the one hand and legislative delegations
of law-interpreting power to agencies on the other." (quoting Clark Byse, Judicial
Review of Administrative Interpretations of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron's Step
Two, 2 Admin. L.J. 255, 261 (1989))) (internal quotation marks omitted); Peter L.
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presumption of congressional delegation triggered by statutory
ambiguity. Although Mead defeated this claim by introducing a
particularized inquiry into congressional delegation under certain
circumstances, the criticism only shifted to a new playing field.
Critics began to argue that the Court does not actually inquire into
whether Congress intends to delegate interpretive authority in particular instances because it considers factors that bear no relation
to that determination. 3
In United States v. Mead Corp., the Court focused on whether
the interpretive method promotes the same sort of "fairness and
deliberation" as do procedures like notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication and whether it "bespeak[s] the legislative type of activity that would naturally bind more than the parties
to the ruling."'24 The Court also considered whether the agency set
out with "a lawmaking pretense in mind."'25 In Barnhartv. Walton,
the Court emphasized the "longstanding duration" of the interpretation, "the interpretive method used," and "the nature of the
question at issue," supplemented by a list of more specific factors.'26
Looking at this hodgepodge, critics found no connection to congressional delegation. As Barron and Kagan wrote, the Court considers factors that reflect "[its] view of how best to allocate interpretive authority," such as procedural formality or agency
deliberation.'27 Merrill made a similar point when he suggested that
Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum. L. Rev.
1093, 1120 (1987) ("Chevron appears to reach this conclusion [that mandatory deference is required] as a general imperative of judicial behavior, unconnected to congressional
3 wishes reflected in any given law.").

" Barron & Kagan, supra note 8, at 219-20.
'24
533 U.S. at 230, 232.

' Id.at 233.
.26
535 U.S. at 220, 222 (internal quotation marks omitted) (relying on "the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance
of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration,
and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of

time").
7

, Barron & Kagan, supra note 8, at 212; see also Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review
of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 371 (1986) ("Using these factors as a means of discerning a hypothetical congressional intent about 'deference'.., allows courts to allocate the law-interpreting function between court and
agency in a way likely to work best within any particular statutory scheme."). Justice
Breyer has since defended the fiction as best promoting "the Constitution's democ-
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the Court is considering "policy arguments" for judicial deference
when looking at the agency's "historical familiarity" with the issue
and its "policymaking expertise."'" On Professor Evan Criddle's
account, the Court is using its delegation fiction "to reach outcomes consistent with Chevron's consensus-based approach," with
a focus on political accountability, "deliberative rationality," and
"national uniformity."'29 Professor Mark Seidenfeld remarked that
"the Court's reliance on factors unrelated to actual congressional
intent [is] best explained by positing that, despite the language in
Mead focusing on actual intent, Mead really depends on constructive congressional intent about whether the agency should get interpretive primacy.""'3
These scholars and others debated which factors the Court ought
to emphasize, particularly when the factors conflict. For example,
Barron and Kagan argued that the Court ought to prioritize political accountability over procedural formality, which leads them to
propose an ingenious method for determining whether a particular
interpretation is accountable enough to merit judicial deference.'
Criddle advocated consideration of all of the consensus-based values.'32 When these values point in the same direction, judicial deference is appropriate. When one or more is missing, judicial deference is inappropriate.'33 Others defended the Court's focus on
procedural formality, even if it sometimes comes at the expense of
political accountability." The more general point is that numerous
scholars have felt at liberty to consider the values that they believe
promote the best allocation of interpretive authority between
courts and agencies precisely because they view the Court as making precisely the same move.
ratic objective," by "ready translation of the general desire of the public for certain
ends, through the legislator's efforts to embody those ends in legislation, into a set of
statutory words that will carry out those general objectives." Breyer, Active Liberty,
supra note 16, at 101.
"Merrill, supra note 3, at 995 n.112 (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety and
Heath Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 153 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2 Criddle, supra note 5, at 1302, 1303.
'oSeidenfeld, supra note 8, at 281.
'3' See Barron & Kagan, supra note 8, at 235 (arguing that courts ought to examine
who within an agency was responsible for the relevant interpretation).
132 Criddle, supra note 5, at 1315-16.
133 Id. at 1316.
See Bressman, supra note 20, at 1479-80.
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Many have further advocated that, whatever the proper allocation of interpretive authority, the Court ought to abandon its fiction of congressional delegation. The fiction is only a thin cover for
other normative values or, worse, for ideological preferences.'35 It
impairs the legitimacy of the Court's interpretive framework because it is a fiction. As Duffy illustrated:
But if this [fiction] is all that supports the Court's Chevron doctrine, something is quite amiss. For how, we must ask, would an
executive branch agency fare before the Supreme Court (especially Justice Scalia) if it were to admit that its statutory authorization for one of its programs-to be sure, a good program supported by many policy considerations-was to be found only in a
"fictional, presumed intent" of Congress? If the Executive would
not be allowed to support its work on such imagined statutory
authority, the Court should be equally demanding in judging the
legitimacy of its own creation.'36
In addition, the fiction ought to be abandoned because it is
prone to misunderstanding and misapplication in practice. When
Mead was decided, Justice Scalia warned that it was likely to confuse courts because of the "utter flabbiness of the Court's criteria." '37 Empirical studies have since confirmed this prediction. '
Those studies reveal that lower courts are uncertain about which of
the Court's factors matters most or how they relate to each other.'39
As a result, lower courts often strive to avoid any determination on

3' See

Criddle, supra note 5, at 1302 (arguing that the Court is now using its delega-

tion fiction "to reach outcomes consistent with Chevron's consensus-based approach"); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 825-26 (2006) (demonstrating empirically that Chevron does not constrain judges from following their
ideological preferences).
, 'Duffy, supra note 3, at 199; see also Criddle, supra note 5, at 1315-16 (arguing
that the fiction impairs the clarity, political stability, and transparency of the Court's
decisions); Sunstein, supra note 16, at 193 (arguing that the Court's decisions "point in
unfortunate directions because they increase uncertainty and judicial policymaking
without promoting important countervailing values").
533 U.S. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3 See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 20, at 1457-69.
Id. at 1458-64.
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the congressional delegation issue, compounding uncertainty as to
which institution possesses interpretive authority."4
My contention is that these arguments about the fiction of congressional delegation are themselves based on a fiction. Scholars
have misread (1) how Congress behaves and (2) what the Court is
actually doing. The next Part looks at Congress and the following
Part looks at the Court.
III. A PICTURE OF LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR

In this Part, I look at legislative behavior. We have evidence that
Congress attends to delegation of interpretive authority when it
writes statutes. That evidence consists of interviews with legislative
staffers and studies of particular statutes. Although this evidence is
not comprehensive, it calls into question-and provides reason to
doubt-the claim that Congress does not think about the delegation of interpretive authority at all or in the way that the Court envisions. This evidence also undermines other claims: that Congress
does not connect the express delegation of regulatory authority
with an implicit delegation of interpretive authority; that Congress
knows how to write express delegations when it wants to delegate
any sort of authority; and that Congress intends for courts to exercise independent judgment on interpretive questions, consistent
with the APA.
A. Attending to the Delegation of InterpretiveAuthority
Professors Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter conducted interviews with legislative staffers and confirmed, among other things,
that Congress attends to the delegation of interpretive authority
when it chooses statutory language."' Those staffers reported that
members of Congress often used "deliberate ambiguity" to obtain
consensus on legislation.'42 Members of Congress were aware that
the decision to use ambiguous or vague words came with a risk that
a court or an agency would choose an interpretation that diverged
Id. at 1464-69.
.4.
See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 10, at 596-97 (interviewing sixteen counsels
working on the Senate Judiciary Committee or one of its subcommittees who reported
that legislative drafting involves a "willful lack of clarity").
142 Id. at 596.
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from their preferences. But for some, the decision did not pose a
risk so much as "an opportunity to let an agency, as opposed to a
court, resolve the issue, and sometimes they specifically desired
this result as well."'43 Competing legislative coalitions were aware
that they could seek to influence an agency to adopt their preferred
position. By choosing words that "mean all things to all people,"
members of Congress knew that they could secure the votes to enact a bill without sacrificing the opportunity to steer the law in
their favored direction."
Professors Joseph Grundfest and Adam Pritchard demonstrated
the same phenomenon by studying a particular statute, the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"). 4 ' Congress
enacted the PSLRA to resolve a series of questions over the applicable pleading standard for securities fraud liability without destroying the consensus necessary to pass the larger reform statute.' 6 The pleading standard under existing securities law had
generated a circuit split among the Courts of Appeals as to
whether it required the plaintiff to show that the defendant in the
securities fraud case had been "barely reckless" or "highly reckless."'47 Furthermore, the circuits had divided as to whether the
plaintiff must "allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of
fraudulent intent" or could merely state "that scienter existed."'48
The PSLRA "purported to resolve this conflict by adopting a uniform standard for pleading scienter, the 'strong inference' standard." 9 But it dodged the underlying issue-whether recklessness
suffices, and if so, what sort-because this issue divided legislators
as it had divided courts.' ° By choosing language that left the issue
unresolved in the statute, Congress allowed "both sides [to] hope
that the Supreme Court would eventually rule in their favor......
Each coalition placed language in the legislative history that the

' Id.

at 596-97.

144
Id.

"'See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 10, at 650-66.
"'Id. at 650.

Id. at 651 (internal quotation marks omitted).
,48
Id. at 652 (internal quotation marks omitted).
147

149Id.
Id. at 658.
151
Id.
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Court could use to adopt a favorable interpretation.'5 2 When President Clinton vetoed the bill, even he took steps to influence subsequent interpretation in the event that Congress nevertheless enacted the bill. In his veto message (the first of his administration),
President Clinton stated that he opposed a heightened pleading
standard and endorsed language in the conference committee report supporting his view.'53
Although this case study demonstrates that Congress thinks
about the delegation of interpretive authority when it chooses
statutory language, it does not involve a delegation to an agency. It
therefore does not substantiate the claim that all statutory ambiguity reflects a delegation to the agency. But the point here is not to
defend an across-the-board presumption of congressional delegation to an agency based on statutory ambiguity. It is to deflect the
claim that Congress does not think about the delegation of interpretive authority when it writes statutes.
Professor Margaret Lemos's case studies of statutes show that
Congress is aware of delegating interpretive authority when it
chooses ambiguous language.'" Her work demonstrates that Congress regards courts (including the Court) as delegates of interpretive authority. This claim bucks conventional wisdom because
scholars are uncomfortable thinking about courts as delegates.'55
Whatever authority courts possess to fill gaps in statutes must be
judicial rather than legislative or executive. Her unconventional
work stands against the broader claim that Congress does not think
about the delegation of interpretive authority at all. Congress does
think about that issue and often views courts and agencies as substitutes based on their relative institutional attributes. For example,
Congress might prefer to delegate to courts if it desires more conservative (that is, narrower) interpretations or more stable interpretations. Again, Lemos's work is not useful to defend an acrossthe-board presumption of congressional delegation to an agency in
the face of statutory ambiguity. In fact, it complicates the argu-

'5

Id. at 657-58.
See id. at 659.
Lemos, Consequences, supra note 10; Lemos, The Other Delegate, supra note 10.

'53
154

See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure 140-41 (1995)
(arguing that courts inevitably make law in the course of adjudication and therefore
exercise judicial power, not legislative power).

2011]

Fictionof CongressionalDelegation

2037

ment, as does the analysis of the PSLRA. Some statutes involve
both courts and agencies and deciding which institution possesses
interpretive authority depends on the statutory scheme that Congress designed.
B. Connecting Regulatory Authority and InterpretiveAuthority
Lemos's work is also relevant to the claim that Congress does
not view interpretive authority as implicitly tied to general regulatory authority. 56 Congress can sever interpretive authority from
general regulatory authority, and it sometimes does. But Lemos's
work suggests why it rarely does and therefore why it is reasonable
to view the greater grant of regulatory authority as conferring the
lesser grant of interpretive authority.
Start from the backdrop of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 or the Sherman Act, the subjects of Lemos's work. These
statutes contain prohibitions on private conduct. Only Title VII directly involves an agency, but that agency does not possess general
regulatory authority. Both grant implementation authority, as well
as interpretive authority, to courts. But neither contains a grant of
rulemaking authority to courts, nor could they do so constitutionally. Courts possess authority to implement the statutes in the
course of case-by-case adjudication. As part of that authority, they
possess the subsidiary authority to interpret the statutes. Some may
argue that this interpretive authority has always belonged to courts
and therefore Congress does not need to delegate it. But that is
silly. Courts have authority to interpret a law because the law gives
parties a right to invoke judicial jurisdiction over that law. Interpretive authority comes from implementation authority. The same
could be said of agencies. When Congress grants an agency general
regulatory authority, which it must do to involve an agency in the
"6 A delegation of general regulatory authority is an express statutory provision
granting an agency the power to "make 'such rules and regulations as are necessary to
carry out the provisions of this chapter' or words to that effect." Thomas W. Merrill &
Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 469 (2002); see also Duffy, supra note 3, at 199-203 (arguing that an express delegation of authority to issue legislative rules carries with it an
implicit delegation of authority to issue statutory interpretations); Merrill & Watts,
supra, (identifying a lost legislative drafting convention for signaling when authority
to issue "rules and regulations" encompassed the power to issue rules with the force
of law).
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implementation of the law, it conveys interpretive authority at the
same time. Congress is not in the habit of viewing the two separately, nor is it in the habit of viewing courts as default interpreters,
requiring an express delegation to agencies. There is a simple way
to put the point: Congress grants authority to make decisions, not
to make policies plus or minus interpretations."' That distinction is
an academic one.
The connection between general regulatory authority and interpretive authority also refutes the expressio unius claim. Congress
does know how to write explicit delegations, and it must do so for
an agency to possess general regulatory authority. But Congress
might assume that the agencies will also possess interpretive authority over any ambiguity that it unintentionally or deliberately
creates. The point again is that Congress may not think about the
delegation of interpretive authority as academics do, focusing on
the need for clear rules to vindicate judicial decisions that basically
get it right. Rather, it may think about the issue as legislators do,
focusing on whether to write clear language or leave room for an
agency or court (which one?) to fill the gaps.
Although Lemos's work is only a starting point, the evidence on
the other side is weak. The best example of the Court refusing to
read a general delegation of regulatory authority to contain a delegation of interpretive authority is the Internal Revenue Code, as
Merrill and Hickman noted when explaining the background understanding before Chevron.' But, until recently, the Court held
that the Internal Revenue Code is subject to a different interpretive framework than ordinary regulatory statutes. 5" Perhaps that
was not clear until Professor William Eskridge and Lauren Baer
demonstrated that the Court actually applies seven or eight differ-

"' Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L.
Rev. 1, 26 (1983) (observing that "'interpretation' of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of law-making authority to an agency").
158Merrill & Hickman, supra note 99, at 871 & n.212 (citing tax cases for the proposition that, if anything, there was a background understanding before Chevron that
the delegation of general rulemaking or adjudicative authority did not confer a grant
of interpretive authority).
...
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1097-1120 (2008) (documenting the diversity of deference doctrines, including one for tax statutes).
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ent deference doctrines.'" In any event, the Court did not apply
Chevron to IRS regulations implementing the Internal Revenue
Code. It was never a good example from which to generalize.
Other statutes contain greater possibility of delegation. Notably,
the Court has now changed its view of the Internal Revenue Code
in line with the suggestion here. In Mayo Foundationfor Medical
Education and Research v. United States, the Court read the explicit delegation of authority to "prescribe all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement" of the Internal Revenue Code to
the Treasury Department to convey a delegation of interpretive
authority.'
C. Maintaininga JudicialCheck
The evidence that Congress attends to the delegation of interpretive authority and thinks about courts and agencies as substitutes for exercising that authority undermines the claim that Congress "intends that courts exercise independent judgment when it
confers authority on agencies subject to APA-style judicial review."' 62 If Congress (1) thinks about the delegation of interpretive
authority, particularly when necessary to obtain legislative consensus, and (2) is not in the habit of distinguishing the delegation of
policymaking and interpretive authority, why would it want to subject interpretations to a more stringent standard of review than
policies (which are subject to the arbitrary and capricious standard
of review)?'63 Critics might answer, "because the APA says so."
But that argument is weak.
First, the language of the APA does not preclude judicial deference. Duffy has already demonstrated why the "questions of law"
language does not preclude judicial deference." 4 In addition to his
argument, there is the more general argument that the language of
160
Id.

,'113 S. Ct. 704, 713-14 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding that
Congress delegated authority to issue interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code
with the force of law to the Treasury Department and that such authority makes those
interpretations eligible for Chevron deference).
62Merrill & Hickman, supra note 99, at 871 n.211.
63See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (directing reviewing courts to "(2) hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law").
'6 Duffy, supra note 3, at 197-98.
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the judicial review provision has in other places not been taken to
mean what it says. Around the time that Chevron was decided, the
Court interpreted the "arbitrary and capricious" language in the
judicial review provision to mean considerably more than it says.
To survive muster under the arbitrary and capricious test, an
agency must provide an extensive explanation demonstrating that
it has complied with a list of factors.'65 This reading is known as the
reasoned decision-making requirement or the hard look doctrine."
Whatever the merits of this reading, it demonstrates that the Court
has not felt constrained by the literal language of the judicial review or even by the compromises that the legislative history reveals. 67' It has interpreted the provision to accommodate felt needs.
Second, the view that Congress intends to delegate interpretive
authority to agencies does not preclude the possibility that Congress also intends for courts to supply a check on that authority.
The relevant question is how stringent a check-de novo review or
reasonableness review? Critics have justified the preference for de
novo review by arguing that Congress does not trust agencies. This
may be true, but it creates a puzzle. When interpretations are often
so much like other policy decisions, involving competing interests
and complex issues, why would Congress intend to treat them so
differently? In other words, if Congress trusts agencies to make
policy decisions, subject to arbitrary and capricious review, why
1'

See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy

in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 475-76 (2003) (noting the shifts in
agency and judicial practice).
166 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (requiring an agency to demonstrate that it has not "relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise"); see also Bressman, supra note
19, at 1776-1804 (describing the extensive role of the Court in elaborating the sparse
language of the APA).
16 See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557, 1561 (1996) (arguing that
the APA was a response to conservatives' fear of New Deal agencies). By contrast,
the Court has felt constrained by the structure of the APA. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 548-49 (1978) (forbidding courts from requiring more procedures in notice-and-comment rulemaking than
the APA requires and observing that the APA creates a bipolar model of informal
rulemaking and formal rulemaking with no hybrid in between).
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would it not trust agencies to issue interpretations, subject to reasonableness review? It is plausible to believe that Congress might
seek greater judicial intervention for certain sorts of questions,
such as those in which Congress has an ongoing interest and agencies or administrations have too great an incentive to proceed unilaterally (recall FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. or
Gonzales v. Oregon)." But it is implausible to believe that Congress makes a general distinction.
To summarize this Part, we have direct evidence from interviews
of legislative staffers and case studies of particular statutes that
Congress attends to the delegation of interpretive authority. This
evidence undermines the claim that Congress does not think about
the delegation of interpretive authority at all. It also helps to explain why (1) Congress might generally view the greater delegation
of general regulatory authority to include a lesser delegation of interpretive authority and (2) the inclusion of a delegation of regulatory authority does not preclude the inference of a delegation of
interpretive authority. This evidence also undermines the APA
claim, although that claim has been weak from the start. Furthermore, viewing Congress as intending to delegate interpretive authority to agencies in the face of statutory ambiguity does not rule
out the view that Congress intends a judicial check when it subjects
agencies to judicial review under the APA. It means that Congress
may generally intend reasonableness review rather than de novo
review.
IV. AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PRACTICE
While I focused in the last Part on Congress, I concentrate in this
Part on the Court. We have evidence that the presumption that the
Court applies and the factors that the Court considers are related
to congressional delegation. Political scientists have demonstrated
how Congress decides to delegate, and their sense is consistent
with the Court's sense. Though this evidence is indirect, it calls into
" Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). I have argued elsewhere that Congress is just as likely to
delegate interpretive authority to an agency over significant questions. See Bressman,
supra note 21, at 608-09, 613-18; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 761, 786-90 (2007) (discussing ways in which the toobig-to-delegate doctrine might relate to legislative intent).
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question-and provides reason to doubt-the claim that the Court
is only considering normative values or following ideological preferences when applying its analysis.'69 It may also be considering the
strategic political interests of Congress.
A. The Nature of the Question and the Expertise of the Agency
Two of the factors that recur in the Court's particularized inquiry are the nature of the question (big or interstitial) and the expertise of the agency. Critics do not view these factors as necessarily bearing a relation to congressional delegation, regardless of
whether they are valid considerations. But political scientists, such
as Professors David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, have asserted
that Congress is likely to delegate authority to agencies to avoid
complex issues and capitalize on agency expertise. Congress could
write "detailed, exacting laws," and deliver to powerful constituents every policy that they desire.'7 The difficulty is that specificity
requires legislative time, expertise, and consensus. 7 ' When any of
these necessary ingredients is in short supply or when legislators
can simply use their time more effectively elsewhere, Congress is
likely to delegate authority to an agency. Thus, "the more complex ... a policy area," the more likely Congress is to delegate authority to an agency to conserve legislative time and capitalize on
agency expertise. The Court's factors fall in line with these ideas.
69

See, e.g., Barron & Kagan, supra note 8, at 212 (arguing that the Court in Chevron is best understood as promoting political accountability); Criddle, supra note 5, at
1302 (arguing that the Court is now using its delegation fiction "to reach outcomes
consistent with Chevron's consensus-based approach"); Miles & Sunstein, supra note
135, at 825-26 (demonstrating empirically that Chevron does not constrain judges
from following their ideological preferences); Note, Justifying the Chevron Doctrine:
Insights from the Rule of Lenity, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 2043, 2048 (2010) (arguing that
the most satisfying justification in Chevron is political accountability).
170 Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 11, at 962; Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions:
The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L. Econ. & Org. 213, 228 (1990) ("The most direct way [to achieve control] is for today's authorities to specify, in excruciating detail,
precisely what the agency is to do and how to do it, leaving as little as possible to the
discretionary judgment of bureaucrats .... ).
171See Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 11, at 967; David B. Spence & Frank
Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 Geo. L.J. 97, 106-12
(2000); B. Dan Wood & John Bohte, Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of
Administrative Design, 66 J. Pol. 176, 177 (2004).
. Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 11, at 967.
'
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In Barnhart v. Walton, the Court mentioned the "interstitial na'
ture" of the question and the "related expertise of the Agency."173
It also pointed to "the importance of the question to administration of the statute" and "the complexity of that administration."'74
In Zuni Public School DistrictNo. 89 v. Department of Education,
it emphasized the "technical nature" of the question."' In FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the question was of the opposite nature.1

76

The Court noted that tobacco regulation had been

subject to ongoing consideration by Congress.17 Physician-assisted
suicide, at issue in Gonzales v. 178Oregon, was subject to ongoing debate by the people themselves.

Scholars (and Justices) have viewed these factors as "agency policy concerns,"' 79 but the factors are more related to congressional
delegation than they appear. They are the sorts of concerns that
political scientists have identified as relevant to how Congress decides to delegate. When these factors are present, political scientists have asserted that Congress is more likely to delegate.
B. The Interpretive Method Used
The most prominent factor in the Court's inquiry is the interpretive method used. This factor was at the core of United States v.
Mead Corp. There the Court examined the interpretive method to
determine whether it reflected "fairness and deliberation" and
whether it connoted "the legislative type of activity that would
naturally bind more than the parties to the ruling."'" The Court
also referred to notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication as the paradigmatic procedures to which Chevron applies."'
Although critics have argued that procedural formality is unrelated to congressional delegation, political scientists have asserted
'

535 U.S. 212,222 (2002).

174Id.

...
550 U.S. 81, 90 (2007).
176529 U.S. 120, 137-39 (2000).
177Id.

' 546 U.S. 243, 249 (2006) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735
(1997)).
17See, e.g., Zuni, 550 U.S. at 107 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
"o Mead, 533 U.S. at 230, 232.
"' Id. at 230.
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that administrative procedures can help Congress monitor how
agencies implement statutes. They started with the observation
that delegation creates a need for legislative monitoring because
agencies may implement statutes in ways that depart from legislative preferences.1" But direct monitoring-that is, watching agencies-is time consuming. According to political scientists such as
Professors Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, Thomas Schwartz,
and Barry Weingast, a more efficient form of monitoring is for
Congress to rely on constituents to watch agencies and call for legislative intervention when agencies depart from their preferences. 83
Administrative procedures, especially notice-and-comment rulemaking, facilitate such efficient "fire-alarm" monitoring." Noticeand-comment rulemaking procedures place constituents in the administrative process, where they may monitor agencies for Congress. '
The Court's concern for procedures, though framed in lawyerly
terms, tracks what political scientists have been saying about procedures. They can be useful to Congress and are therefore part of
the delegation calculus. When procedures are absent, Congress is
less able to rely on this efficient form of monitoring. Furthermore,
under circumstances such as those in Mead or Gonzales, it may
have no ability to monitor at all because it lacks awareness of the
interpretation until that interpretation reaches a court. One of the
benefits of notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures is that they
bring information about agency actions to light before those actions are final, allowing Congress to intervene more efficiently and
effectively. After an action is final, neither the agency nor Con' See Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 11, at 963 (observing that agencies are influenced "by the President, by interest groups, by the courts, and by the bureaucrats
themselves"); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in Can the Government Govern? 267, 271 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) ("Experts
have their own interests-in career, in autonomy-that may conflict with those of
[legislators].").
' Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165,166-72 (1984).
184 Bressman, supra note 19, at 1767-71.
1..See McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 11, at 246; McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, supra note 11, at 442; see also Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., Pablo T. Spiller & Santiago Urbiztondo, An Informational Perspective
on Administrative Procedures, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 283, 300-01 (1999) (modeling the
function of administrative procedures).
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gress has the ability to change it without formal action-either a
new rule or statute. Before an action is final, an agency can better
respond to informal congressional pressure. Formal adjudication
does not have this feature, even though the Court in Mead listed it
as a good indication of congressional delegation. But formal adjudication at least serves the transparency function that is essential
for legislative monitoring.
What about the "'longstanding' duration" of the interpretation
and "the careful consideration the Agency has given the question
over a long period of time," other factors that the Court considered
in Barnhart?'"These factors are also broadly consistent with the
political science account of congressional delegation because they
reduce monitoring costs. If Congress is aware of an agency interpretation when drafting legislation and can rely on the consistency
of that interpretation over time, it has less need to monitor the interpretation over time. The Court might count such consistency as
an indication that Congress could delegate with confidence. On the
other hand, if Congress has been misled by an agency about an interpretation at the time of drafting, then no amount of monitoring
is dependable. Thus, the Court might count such bad faith as a
counter-indication of delegation.1 "8
By putting together the three considerations-the nature of the
question, the expertise of the agency, and the interpretive method
used-we can also see why a presumption of delegation is consistent with legislative interests. The Court might believe, as political
scientists have asserted, that Congress is likely to delegate complex
questions to capitalize on agency expertise. The Court might also
believe, as political scientists have asserted, that when an issue is
contentious, Congress is likely to delegate to obtain legislative consensus. Furthermore, the Court might believe, as political scientists
have asserted, that the regulatory state is characterized by these
sorts of questions. They are the norm rather than the exception.
Justice Stevens floated these ideas in Chevron, but they are more

535 U.S. at 220, 222.
Cf. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 213-28 (1974) (rejecting this interpretation because Congress was aware when drafting legislation that agency did not consistently
adhere to its interpretation and had misled members of the relevant committee about
that interpretation).
'
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grounded than they seem." They fall in line with what political scientists have been saying about Congress's delegation calculus.
To summarize this Part, the political science account of congressional delegation provides indirect support for the Court's framework. This is not to deny that the Court's factors serve normative
values, such as promoting rational deliberation and procedural
fairness. Nor is it to deny that the Court's presumption serves normative values, such as political accountability, or reduces institutional costs, such as judicial uncertainty and analytical complexity.
Rather, it is to say that the Court's framework is also consistent
with legislative interests. By making this claim, I do not imagine
the Justices reading the work of political scientists. I instead credit
the Court for recognizing that Congress is a distinct entity, motivated by political concerns rather than purely normative ones. The
Court considers those political concerns precisely because it is trying to capture Congress's statutory design choices. It may be that
critics have not accurately perceived what the Court is doing because they themselves have been too fixated on normative concerns.
V. AN ORDINARY FICTION
In the previous Parts, I demonstrated that the fiction of congressional delegation is not as false or fraudulent as scholars believe. In
this Part, I explore the "true" character of the fiction. I argue that
the fiction is no different in kind than the one that the Court often
applies in determining the meaning of statutes. Conceived this way,
it is not so easily dismissed and ought to be reconsidered.
The fiction arises not because the Court does not actually inquire
into whether Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority
to an agency, as scholars believe. Rather, it arises because the
Court does not inquire into whether Congress actually intended to
delegate interpretive authority to an agency. The phrasing is very
similar, but the effect is quite different. To determine whether
Congress intended to delegate, the Court infers legislative intent
from the available sources, including statutory text, statutory context, and legislative history. Thus, it employs a fictionalized notion
of legislative intent.
' 467 U.S. at 865.
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This fiction is not surprising or exceptional. Early in the twentieth century, legal realism cast doubt on whether Congress, as a
multi-member body, can possess a single, collective intention and
whether courts possess the tools to ascertain that intention. "9 The
Legal Process School stepped in to offer courts a way to impute
legislative intent, directing them to interpret statutes by assuming
that "reasonable legislators pursue reasonable purposes reasonably.' 190 Justice Breyer is the leading voice for this approach on the
sitting Court, but he is not alone in imputing legislative intent.19 '
The Court often imputes legislative intent when determining the
meaning of statutory language, relying on statutory text, statutory
context, and legislative history."9 Functionally, the Court is attributing collective intent to determine the delegation of interpretative
19

See Radin, supra note 14, at 870-71 (critiquing the notion of collective intent).

See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (2d ed. 1963)
(demonstrating the impossibility of collective intent); Moglen & Pierce, supra note I,
at 1211 (describing "the largely implicit fictional assumptions that judges make about
the group behavior of legislators that are and have been the foundation of judicial interpretation of legislative documents").
19 See Hart & Sacks, supra note 15, at 1378.
191 See Breyer, Active Liberty, supra note 16, at 98-101.
'9See, e.g., Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 147 (2008) (Breyer, J., joined by
Roberts, C.J., Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ.) (finding, after examining statutory text, basic purpose, and whole code, "no reason to believe that Congress intended to bring within the statute's scope these kinds of crimes, far removed as they
are from the deliberate kind of behavior associated with violent criminal use of firearms"); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
joined by Roberts, C.J., Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ.)
(finding, after examining statutory text and generally acknowledged purpose, "strong
reason to believe that Congress intended the differences that its language suggests, for
the two provisions differ not only in language but in purpose as well"); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 757 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("In 1948, when the
Federal Tort Claims Act was enacted, it is also true, Congress reasonably might have
anticipated that the then prevailing choice-of-law methodology, reflected in the Restatement (First) of Conflicts, would lead mechanically to the law of the place of injury."); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 440 (1998) (Stevens, J.) ("If, as Congress reasonably may have assumed, the formal requirements in § 1409(a)(4) tend to make it
just as likely that fathers will have the opportunity to develop a meaningful relationship with their children as does the fact that the mother knows of her baby's existence
and often has custody at birth, the statute's effect will reduce, rather than aggravate,
the disparity between the two classes of children."); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 503 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) ("In my view, the legislative history of
§ 103(0(2) demonstrates that Congress reasonably concluded that private and governmental discrimination had contributed to the negligible percentage of public contracts awarded minority contractors.").
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authority in much the same way under Mead/Barnhartand Brown
& Williamson/Gonzales.
The Court also frequently applies various presumptions of legislative intent, some of which are less well-grounded in legislative
behavior than Chevron's presumption.193 Chevron's presumption
reflects a reasonable probability about how Congress behaves.
Some presumptions or canons of construction do not reflect such a
reasonable probability. For example, is it a reasonable probability
that Congress does not intend to raise serious constitutional questions, or is the Court hesitant to make more constitutional law than
necessary?'9" In any event, the constitutional avoidance canon is a
normalized tool for picking between two possible interpretations.
Chevron's presumption is essentially the same for picking between
two possible interpreters.
Even if the fiction of congressional delegation is an ordinary
one, there is room to argue about its implementation. For example,
Justice Scalia is no more a fan of a standard-based approach or judicial reliance on legislative history here than in other contexts.19
But his objection raises separate issues-the rules/standards debate
and the legislative history debate."9 Critics of the fiction of congressional delegation generally have not been reprising these debates.

"' See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J.) ("It is
a well-established rule of construction that '[w]here Congress uses terms that have
accumulated settled meaning under ... the common law, a court must infer, unless
the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established
meaning of these terms."' (alteration in original) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Clark
v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.) ("[The canon of constitutional avoidance] is
a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text,
resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative
which raises serious constitutional doubts.").
'4 See Smith, supra note 1, at 1463-64 (noting that the unconstitutionality canon is
not premised on a fact about how Congress acts but is propounding a normative view
that Congress does not intend to enact unconstitutional statutes).
'9'See Scalia, supra note 17, at 29-37 (discussing and rejecting judicial reliance on
legislative history).
'9 See Thomas Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules, Standards, Meta-Rules and
Meta-Standards, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 807, 807-08 (2007) (noting the rules/standards
debate in Mead); Sunstein, supra note 16, at 197-205 (examining the rules/standards
debate between Justices Scalia and Breyer).
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Nor have critics been engaging the benefits of the fiction. In
other writing, I have said that the fiction of congressional delegation ensures judicial consideration of Congress's role in lawmaking,
consistent with separation of powers."9 Without a concern for congressional interests, regulatory policy is a one-branch enterprise.
Even if Presidents are accountable and agencies are experts, unitary lawmaking is not the government that the Framers envisioned.
In addition to the normative point, using the fiction to clarify the
contours of the doctrine has a practical benefit for lower courts
charged with applying that doctrine. 98' I have also shown that extending the fiction may address a problem implicit in the Court's
framework, namely, that it invites courts to rely too heavily on the
traditional tools of statutory construction and ignore other signs
that Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority to the
agency."9 Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Departmentof Education illustrates the problem. The dissenters favored a literalistic
meaning that precluded consideration of other signs of congressional delegation.2" But the problem was not limited to textualism.
Justice Stevens applied purposivism with the same result." Justice
Breyer inverted the steps of Chevron to avoid the trap of the traditional tools.2' This use of the fiction, I contended, would finally tailor statutory interpretation to fit the regulatory state. 3
I do not intend to reargue these points here. My concern is more
basic. Critics have not fully appreciated these points or others because they have felt free to disregard the fiction of congressional
delegation. As a result, the debate over how to allocate interpretive authority between courts and agencies has gotten too far away
from how Congress designs statutes. My argument would reset the
debate. In the end, critics could still argue that other considerations
are more important to the analysis than legislative interests. But
they would have to defeat legislative interests rather than simply
dismissing them.
'97See Bressman, supra note 19, at 1790-91.
,9 See Bressman, supra note 20, at 1448.
'See Bressman, supra note 21, at 575-76.
550 U.S. 81, 113 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
201Id. at 106 (Stevens, J., concurring).
202See id. at 107 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing Justice Breyer's opinion "invert[ing] Chevron's logical progression").
See Bressman, supra note 21, at 575-88.
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CONCLUSION

Legal fictions are judicial constructs that help courts decide
cases, but some are better than others. According to critics, the fiction that the Court employs to review agency statutory interpretations is the worst sort, both false and fraudulent. Congress is
unlikely to delegate interpretive authority at all or in the way that
the Court imagines. Furthermore, the Court does not actually care
about whether Congress intends to delegate interpretive authority
in any particular instance and instead applies a presumption triggered by statutory ambiguity and a particularized analysis involving factors that bear no relation to congressional delegation.
I have argued that critics have been proceeding on a misimpression of the Court's fiction, both in terms of legislative behavior and
judicial practice. First, there is direct evidence that Congress attends to the delegation of interpretive authority when it writes
statutory language. It may regard the delegation of general regulatory authority as sufficient to convey a delegation of interpretive
authority. Second, there is indirect evidence that the Court's
framework captures whether Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority. The Court applies a presumption of legislative
intent and draws an inference of legislative intent that corresponds
to the political science account of how Congress decides to delegate. By applying a presumption and drawing an inference, the
Court is employing a fiction. It does not care about whether Congress actually intended to delegate interpretive authority in any
particular instance. But the fiction that the Court employs is no different in kind from the one that it often employs when interpreting
statutes. The fiction is an ordinary fiction.
By proceeding under a misimpression about the fiction of congressional delegation, critics have had license to disregard it in
evaluating how to allocate interpretive authority between courts
and agencies. This Essay seeks to bring that issue back to how
Congress designs statutes. Critics could still argue that other considerations are more important to statutory interpretation, but the
burden of persuasion is higher than they thought.

